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Housing Production Subsidies 
and Neighborhood 
Revitalization:
New York City’s Ten-Year 
Capital Plan for Housing
perennial question in housing policy concerns the form 
that housing assistance should take. Although some argue 
that housing assistance should be thought of as a form of 
income support and advocate direct cash grants to needy 
households, others favor earmarked assistance—but they differ 
over whether subsidies should be given to the recipients as 
vouchers or to developers as production subsidies.
The appropriate composition of housing assistance has 
recently taken on particular import. In 2000, Congress created 
the Millennial Housing Commission and gave it the task of 
evaluating the “effectiveness and efficiency” of methods to 
promote housing through the private sector. As part of its 
mandate, the commission is examining changes to existing 
programs as well as the creation of new production programs 
to increase affordable housing.
This paper reexamines the debate over the appropriate form 
of housing assistance. First, we briefly summarize and evaluate 
arguments in favor of demand-oriented housing subsidies 
(such as Section 8 vouchers) and supply-oriented housing 
subsidies (such as production subsidies). We conclude that 
although demand-oriented subsidies are preferable to supply-
oriented subsidies on a number of grounds, government 
support for production may, at least theoretically, be justified 
as a way to promote positive spillover effects and neighbor-
hood revitalization. Whether sufficient spillovers exist is, in the 
end, an empirical question. Although much of the existing 
research finds little evidence of spillover effects, our findings on 
the New York City experience suggest that spillovers may be 
significant and large enough to justify government support for 
production.
Next, we describe the most extensive experiment in the 
United States in which a city used supply-oriented subsidies to 
rebuild neighborhoods—New York City’s Ten-Year Capital 
Plan for Housing (the “Ten-Year Plan”). Born out of the 
necessity to rebuild communities devastated by years of 
abandonment and arson, the program, launched by New York 
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City in 1986, ultimately led to the investment of more than 
$5.1 billion in housing in many of the city’s poorest 
neighborhoods.
Finally, we describe the results of several empirical studies 
we have recently completed on the effect of the Ten-Year Plan 
on property values in New York City. Our results suggest that 
the use of production subsidies can indeed generate positive 
spillovers and contribute to neighborhood revitalization. 
Furthermore, by comparing and contrasting New York City’s 
experiences with those of other cities, we explain why New 
York was so successful, and identify aspects of its program that 
could be transplanted to other cities.
2. Justifications for Housing
Assistance: Revisiting the 
Supply-versus-Demand Debate
Although housing subsidies have become commonplace in the 
United States, it is still worthwhile to consider whether 
household financial assistance might be tied to housing rather 
than just provided as unrestricted cash grants. If the only 
housing-related problem facing Americans was insufficient 
income among poor families to purchase adequate housing, 
then a strong argument could be made that unrestricted cash 
grants would be best. In a liberal society dedicated to free 
choice, allowing individuals to make their own decisions with 
respect to consumption would generally seem desirable. 
Furthermore, considerable evidence suggests that unrestricted 
cash grants would lead to increases in housing consumption 
that fall short of the grant amount (Polinsky and Ellwood 
1979). The implication is that earmarking subsidies for housing 
would be a less efficient way than cash grants to enhance 
household welfare. Finally, earmarked housing assistance 
carries an additional inefficiency—the cost of administration 
necessitated by the requirement that the money be spent on a 
specific good.
Despite the inefficiency, since the end of World War II, 
federal, state, and city governments have repeatedly tied 
subsidies to housing consumption. A number of justifications 
might be offered for this. First, consumers may have 
incomplete information about the benefits and importance of 
adequate housing, leading them to spend too little on it. People 
who choose other goods and services before a minimum level 
of shelter may do so because they lack sufficient information or 
are unable to assess rationally the true worth of decent housing, 
thereby justifying societal paternalism. Second, efforts to 
provide a minimum level of housing consumption may be 
necessary to protect children from irresponsible parents, who 
would, without government intervention, provide inadequate 
housing for their children. Third, taxpayers may derive utility 
merely from the knowledge that people are not living in 
desperately deteriorated and unhealthy accommodations 
(Aaron 1972; Schill 1990; Olsen 2001). Thus, taxpayers may 
prefer that their tax dollars subsidize someone’s shelter 
directly, since it yields a greater increase in housing 
consumption per public dollar spent than do cash transfers, 
even if housing subsidies are less useful to the recipient than 
cash transfers.
In addition to achieving redistributive and/or paternalistic 
goals, earmarked housing assistance may be preferable to cash 
transfers in addressing other economic and social objectives. 
Such goals might include lessening adjustment lags in supply 
and demand, ameliorating the impact of discrimination in the 
housing market, improving the locations in which families 
live, and promoting positive spillovers and neighborhood 
redevelopment (see Ellen, Schill, Schwartz, and Voicu [2001]).
The observation that earmarked housing assistance may 
further some or all of these objectives does not, however, 
suggest what form this assistance should take. In the remainder 
of this section, we examine what we have learned about the 
relative merits of different approaches. In particular, we discuss 
the advantages and disadvantages of supply- and demand-
oriented housing subsidy programs.
According to recent estimates, the federal government 
provides housing assistance to roughly 5.2 million renter 
households. An additional 9 million households qualify for 
assistance but do not receive it because housing subsidies are 
neither an entitlement nor a fully funded social welfare 
program (U.S. General Accounting Office 2001). This scarcity 
of subsidies makes efficient deployment of government 
resources crucial. Thus, it is important to begin by noting that 
virtually every empirical study performed over the past twenty-
five years has found that demand-oriented subsidies (that is, 
vouchers and certificates) are more cost-effective than supply-
oriented programs that subsidize the production of housing 
(including the public housing program, the Section 8 new 
construction program, and the low-income housing tax 
credit).1
A 2001 study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), 
for example, compared the cost, both in total and in the 
amount borne by the federal government, of housing vouchers 
over a thirty-year period with the cost of housing built using 
the low-income housing tax credit, the HOPE VI program, 
Section 202, Section 811, and Section 515. According to the 
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programs ranged from 12 percent to 27 percent more than the 
cost of voucher programs (U.S. General Accounting Office 
2001, p. 2). In terms of the cost to the federal government, the 
production programs were between 15 percent and 38 percent 
more expensive.2
In addition to being cheaper than production programs, 
housing vouchers have typically led to better locational 
(neighborhood) outcomes. Supply-oriented programs operate 
with a built-in contradiction: programs that try to target scarce 
resources to the neediest recipients (such as the public housing 
program) end up creating intensely concentrated poverty. And 
there is growing and persuasive evidence that concentrations of 
poverty are related to a wide variety of social problems, 
including high crime, dropout, welfare receipt, and teenage 
pregnancy rates.3 Programs with less effective targeting (such 
as HOPE VI or the low-income housing tax credit) foster more 
economically integrated environments—but the cost is vertical 
inequity.
Housing vouchers resolve this contradiction. Because the 
voucher recipient can rent housing in the private market 
(restricted only by maximum fair market rents), the more 
narrowly a voucher program is targeted to the poor, the more 
likely it is that deconcentration will occur. Indeed, research has 
typically shown that the neighborhood outcomes of voucher 
recipients dominate those who live in housing supported by 
production subsidies; voucher recipients see greater 
improvement in their neighborhood conditions than do public 
housing recipients. As an example, using data from the 1990 
census, Newman and Schnare (1997) conclude that project-
based assistance programs “do little” to improve the quality of 
recipients’ neighborhoods (and, in the case of public housing, 
“appear to make things significantly worse”), while certificate 
and voucher programs reduce the probability that a family will 
live in the most economically and socially distressed areas 
(pp. 726-7). They provide a powerful argument in favor of 
vouchers.
In some housing markets, however, vouchers may not live 
up to their promise. In markets with extremely low vacancy 
rates, such as New York City in the late 1990s, voucher 
recipients might experience significant difficulties identifying 
standard-quality housing with rents below federally prescribed 
maximum levels.4 Although this imbalance of supply and 
demand might be a short-term phenomenon caused by a 
sudden exogenous increase in demand for housing, it might be 
chronic and attributable to barriers (including regulatory 
barriers) in the housing market (Salama, Schill, and Stark 
1999).
In such tight housing markets, production subsidies can, in 
principle, enable households to obtain housing faster and more 
cheaply than vouchers can. In practice, however, government-
supported development is frequently slowed by bureaucratic 
delays, neighborhood opposition, and political pressure. 
Moreover, if regulatory barriers are the problem, direct 
government provision is hardly the ideal response—instead, a 
much better solution would be to remove the barriers that 
interfere with the smooth operation of the housing market.
Subsidizing production can also, again in principle, be 
justified as a method of eliminating or ameliorating the effects 
of discrimination in the housing market.5 Discriminatory 
treatment may increase search costs, drive up the cost of 
housing for its victims, and interfere with optimal residential 
location decisions. Since government provision should be 
nondiscriminatory, direct provision of housing by government 
may be proposed as a partial solution to the problem of 
housing discrimination. Unfortunately, some of the most 
blatant acts of discrimination by landlords in the United States 
have been committed by government agencies and some of the 
most segregated housing developments in the nation are 
owned by public housing authorities (Hirsch 1983). 
Furthermore, even if government could be relied upon to 
operate in a nondiscriminatory manner, it is unclear whether 
production programs would be the most effective way to 
ameliorate the effects of housing discrimination. Instead, more 
vigorous enforcement of antidiscrimination laws may be more 
effective and preferable.
Although production programs do not have a comparative 
advantage over vouchers in cost-effectiveness or improving 
locational outcomes, and the case for relying upon them to deal 
with market failures such as adjustment lags and discrimi-
nation seems weak, production programs may be justified 
by their ability to promote neighborhood development. 
Production programs may generate positive external benefits 
to the neighborhoods in which they are located above and 
beyond the benefits received by the housing consumers 
themselves.
Because housing is fixed in space, its condition influences 
the value of neighboring properties. A dilapidated structure, 
for instance, can reduce the value of neighboring homes and 
may lead to disinvestment in the neighborhood. Introducing a 
high-quality building might, however, generate positive 
spillovers and increase values and confidence in the area. 
Adding new housing might also bring new people to a 
neighborhood, which may, in turn, improve neighborhood 
safety and fuel demand for retail services. If  building owners do 
not bear all of the costs (or benefits) generated by their 
properties, the private sector will underinvest in housing. 
Public intervention, such as slum clearance or rehabilitation 
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Similarly, production programs may generate infor-
mational externalities. Housing developers may be averse to 
investing in distressed urban neighborhoods because they have 
little information about the demand for new housing in the 
area. Housing investment in distressed neighborhoods, then, 
may be delayed or be insufficient because each developer 
hesitates to make the first move. Government, through 
subsidies and planning, can, in principle, encourage developers 
to make the first move, provide information, and thereby 
reduce risk (Caplin and Leahy 1998).
If any form of housing subsidy is likely to be capable of 
generating positive spillovers and catalyzing neighborhood 
development, it would seem to be production subsidies rather 
than vouchers. Indeed, the key shortcoming of production 
subsidies—their concentration in spatially defined areas—
becomes an advantage when it comes to neighborhood 
revitalization. Although vouchers increase demand and may 
well stimulate a supply response (including both new units and/
or housing rehabilitation to meet minimum standards), their 
reliance upon individual decisionmaking limits their 
effectiveness in achieving spatially targeted goals. Individual 
voucher recipients choosing where to rent housing do not take 
into account the effect their choice will have on the surrounding 
neighborhood and thus are unlikely to choose the locations 
where external benefits are maximized. Housing agencies and 
community-based nonprofit organizations responsible for 
locating and implementing production programs, however, are 
more likely to consider the interests and needs of entire 
communities rather than just individual tenants.
It is unclear whether or not public officials and nonprofit 
developers do, in fact, successfully deploy production subsidies 
to create housing that generates positive spillover effects. As the 
remainder of this paper demonstrates, until recently, there has 
been little evidence that government housing programs 
generate positive spillover effects and successfully promote 
neighborhood revitalization. Nevertheless, our analysis of 
New York City’s Ten-Year Capital Plan for Housing, 
specifically designed to revitalize neighborhoods devastated by 
years of abandonment, has yielded strong evidence that these 
spillover effects may be significant.
3. New York City’s Ten-Year 
Capital Plan for Housing
The results of our research on the spillover effects of affordable 
housing investment differ substantially from those of earlier 
studies. To some extent, these differences derive from the 
particular circumstances and features of the programs 
composing the Ten-Year Plan. Thus, this section describes 
these programs, paying particular attention to those features 
that may have been especially important in driving spillover 
effects.
Throughout the twentieth century, New York City has been 
among the leading innovators in housing policy. In 1935, New 
York was the first city in the United States to build public 
housing. New York’s Fair Housing Practices Act of 1957 was 
the first law to make illegal discrimination against racial 
minorities by private landlords. In addition, the Act’s Mitchell-
Lama Middle Income Housing Program became a model for 
Congress when it passed the first below-market interest rate 
programs, in the 1960s.
Thus, New York City Mayor Ed Koch’s announcement of 
the Ten-Year Plan in 1985 was not entirely unprecedented. 
Indeed, many of the programs that would be encompassed in 
the plan were already in existence in 1985, albeit at substantially 
lower rates of activity. The rough contours of the plan were first 
announced in the Mayor’s State of the City Speech (Koch 1985, 
p. 8). The goal was to renovate or build 252,000 units and make 
a financial commitment of $5.1 billion (City of New York 
1988). To fund the program, Koch proposed using money 
from the World Trade Center to finance approximately 
$1 billion in bonds. Other revenues would come from the city’s 
Housing Development Corporation and its capital budget.
Certainly, a principal objective of the Ten-Year Plan was to 
create additional housing opportunities for low- and 
moderate-income families as well as the homeless. In addition, 
a focus on neighborhood revitalization was evident from the 
beginning of the plan. According to the mayor, “first, we intend 
to undertake a major effort to rebuild entire neighborhoods of 
perhaps 15 to 25 square blocks throughout the City . . . it is 
anticipated that such concentrated revitalization would 
provide the hub for further development” (Koch 1985, p. 11). 
A 1989 report by the New York City Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development (HPD) made the point even 
more explicitly: “We’re creating more than just apartments—
we’re re-creating neighborhoods. We’re revitalizing parts of 
the city that over the past two decades had been decimated by 
disinvestment, abandonment, and arson.”
In New York City’s Ten-Year Plan, the location of housing 
investments was, to some extent, dictated by where the city 
owned property. During the late 1970s, the city had taken 
ownership of more than 100,000 vacant and occupied apartments 
as a result of tax foreclosure. This so-called in rem housing, 
named after the legal action that vested title in the city, would 
provide the raw material for the lion’s share of the program.
Over time, HPD created a vast array of programs that 
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preservation and revitalization were important objectives of 
the plan, the city implemented programs that made 
community-based nonprofit organizations the major 
stakeholders in housing production. According to Felice 
Michetti, a former HPD commissioner and one of the principal 
architects of the plan, “when the Ten-Year Plan began, there 
were about twelve not-for-profits in the City of New York that 
were actively involved in housing . . . . By the time I left HPD, 
there were over a hundred not-for-profits involved in the Ten-
Year Plan, and involved not in the traditional federal role of 
sponsoring projects, but actively involved [in development]” 
(New York City Department of Housing Preservation and 
Development 2000, p. 25). For-profit housing developers were 
also active participants, attracted by the development fees or 
the promise of long-term property value appreciation. Local 
financial institutions and intermediaries were active 
participants as well.
Over the course of the Ten-Year Plan, the city utilized at 
least 105 programs, many of which produced only a handful of 
units. Although the majority of these programs involved 
renovation of occupied housing, our focus in this paper is on 
the 66,147 new housing units created—through either new 
construction or the gut rehabilitation of formerly vacant 
buildings.6 In most instances, the city’s subsidy for housing was 
not limited to capital dollars. Most newly constructed or 
rehabilitated housing also qualified for property tax 
abatements and/or exemptions.7 We divide these programs 
into four categories, based on whether they involved new 
construction or gut rehabilitation and whether they were slated 
for homeownership or rental use. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution of Ten-Year-Plan units across these four categories. The 
bulk of the units were rental, created from the gut rehabilitation 
of formerly vacant buildings.
4. Evidence of Spillover Effects:
New York City and Elsewhere
Here, we review the results of our recent empirical work on 
the effect of the New York City’s Ten-Year Capital Plan for 
Housing on property values in the city. We compare and 
contrast New York City’s experiences with those of other cities 
to explain why New York was so successful as well as which 
aspects of its program might be successfully transplanted to 
other cities.
4.1 Evidence from New York City
Using a unique administrative data set, we have completed a 
series of studies on New York City’s Ten-Year Capital Plan for 
Housing (Ellen, Schill, Susin, and Schwartz 2001; Schill, Ellen, 
Schwartz, and Voicu 2001; Ellen, Schill, Schwartz, and Voicu 
2001). Although each of our studies has differed in focus, our 
core objective was to examine whether investments in place-
based housing programs have an effect on the value of homes 
in surrounding neighborhoods and to derive estimates of the 
sign and significance (both substantive and statistical) of these 
effects. All three studies found evidence of positive and 
significant spillover effects.
Our first study explored the effects of the Nehemiah Plan 
and the New Homes Program of the New York City 
Partnership, both of which subsidize the development of 
affordable, owner-occupied homes in distressed urban 
neighborhoods (Ellen, Schill, Susin, and Schwartz 2001). In the 
second study, we expanded the analysis to consider the effects 
of a wider range of housing subsidized through the Ten-Year 
Plan; for instance, we analyzed the effects of rental and 
homeownership programs and renovation and rehabilitation 
as well as new construction programs (Schill, Ellen, Schwartz, 
and Voicu 2001). For the third study, we restricted our analysis 
to the effects of newly created units, investigated differences in 
spillover effects across types of housing programs, and 
provided some evidence to suggest how the magnitude of the 
spillover benefits generated by these units compared with their 
approximate costs (Ellen, Schill, Schwartz, and Voicu 2001).
Table 1







Rehabilitation of vacant buildings 2,801 4.2
New construction 16,813 25.4
Total owner-oriented programs 19,614 29.7
Renter-oriented programs
Rehabilitation of vacant buildings 41,484 62.7
New construction 5,049 7.6
Total renter-oriented programs 46,533 70.3
Total—all classes 66,147 100.0
Note: Figures include all Ten-Year-Plan new housing projects in the
New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development 
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For consistency with other analyses (which typically focus 
on new units) and for brevity, we mainly review the methods 
and results of our most recent study of newly created units. Our 
basic empirical strategy in all of these studies, however, was the 
same: we used a difference-in-difference model to compare the 
sales prices of properties within 500-foot rings of Ten-Year-
Plan sites to the prices of comparable properties in the same 
census tracts (but outside the rings). We then compared the 
magnitude of this difference before and after the completion of 
a Ten-Year-Plan project to estimate the effect of the housing 
investment on property values.
More formally, we used a fixed-effects hedonic price model, 
adapted from Galster, Tatian, and Smith (1999), which 
controls for structural characteristics of the property. In this 
model, the fixed effects are specified as census tract, quarter-
specific fixed effects.8 In other words, we effectively included a 
separate dummy variable for each census tract for each of the 
seventy-nine quarters in our data.9 This allowed us to control 
for neighborhood-specific price changes over our time period.
The core equation we estimated is shown below, where 
 is the log of the sales price (per unit) of property i in 
census tract c in quarter t;   is a vector of property-related 
characteristics, including age and structural characteristics 
(square footage, lot size, garage); and   is a vector of 
locational attributes—specifically, a set of what we call “ring” 
variables: whether a sale is within 500 feet of a Ten-Year-Plan 
site, whether any units are completed within this distance, and, 
if so, the number and mix of the completed units. Finally, 
are a series of dummy variables indicating the quarter and 
census tract of the sale.10
(1)  .
To help explain our identification strategy, Table 2 provides 
a list of ring variables. First, we include a series of in-ring 
dummy variables, which indicate whether a property sold is 
within 500 feet of a particular type of Ten-Year-Plan project, 









In ring, new units, owner but not renter
1-100 units 1 if the property sold is within 500 feet of 1-100 homeownership new units, whether completed or not,
  but not of rental new units; 0 otherwise
101+ units 1 if the property sold is within 500 feet of more than 100 homeownership new units, whether completed
  or not, but not of rental new units; 0 otherwise
In ring, new units, renter but not owner
1-100 units 1 if the property sold is within 500 feet of 1-100 rental new units, whether completed or not, but not
  of homeownership new units; 0 otherwise
101+ units 1 if the property sold is within 500 feet of more than 100 rental new units, whether completed or not,
  but not of rental new units; 0 otherwise
In ring, new units, owner and renter
1-100 units 1 if the property sold is within 500 feet of 1-100 homeownership and rental new units, whether
  completed or not, but not of rental new units; 0 otherwise
101+ units 1 if the property sold is within 500 feet of more than 100 homeownership and rental new units, whether
  completed or not, but not of rental new units; 0 otherwise
Post ring, new units 1 if the property sold is within 500 feet of any completed new units; 0 otherwise
Number of new units at time of sale Number of completed new units within 500 feet of the property sold
(Number of new units at time of sale)2 Squared number of new units at time of sale
Share of multifamily new units at time of sale Share of completed new units within 500 feet of the property sold that are in multifamily buildings
Share of rental new units at time of sale Share of completed new units within 500 feet of the property sold that are rentals
Share of new construction units at time of sale Share of completed new units within 500 feet of the property sold that are in newly constructed
  buildings
Tpost, new units Years since earliest completion of new units within 500 feet of the property sold; 0 if no new units were
  completed before sale
Tpost*(number of new units at time of sale) Interaction term
Note: “New units” is defined as newly constructed units and rehabilitated (formerly) vacant units.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / June 2003 77
Price relative to rest of tract
Chart 1
Percentage Price Differences in 500-Foot Ring 
and Surrounding Tracts, by Number of Units Built
Rings with Homeownership Units Only 
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may have been located in different kinds of neighborhoods, we 
defined six mutually exclusive in-ring variables—properties 
within 500 feet of large homeownership projects, small 
homeownership projects, large rental projects, and so on. 
Second, we included a post-ring variable that indicates if there 
are any completed units within 500 feet of the sale. The 
coefficient on this variable indicates the extent to which, after 
the completion of a development of any size, sales prices rise in 
the vicinity relative to the average increase in the larger census 
tract. Third, we controlled for the number of completed units 
within this distance and the share of completed units that were 
in multifamily structures, were rentals, and were in newly 
constructed buildings. Finally, we include Tpost, which indi-
cates the years since completion, and Tpost interacted with 
number of completed units to see if the effect changed over 
time and whether this change was shaped by the size of the 
project.
To estimate this model, we used a combination of three geo-
coded administrative data sets. First, we used detailed data on 
the location (down to the block level) of all housing built or 
renovated through the Ten-Year Plan. Second, through an 
arrangement with the New York City Department of Finance, 
we obtained a database that contains sales transaction prices for 
all apartment buildings, condominium apartments, and single-
family homes over the 1980s and 1990s.11 We used GIS 
techniques to measure the distance from each sale to all Ten-
Year-Plan sites. Our final sample in the three studies ranges 
from 234,000 to 294,000 property sales, a very large sample size 
compared with much of the literature.
Third, we supplemented these transaction data with 
building characteristics from an administrative data set 
gathered for the purpose of assessing property taxes (the RPAD 
file). The RPAD data contain information about buildings but 
do not contain much information about the characteristics of 
individual units in apartment buildings (except for condo-
miniums). Nonetheless, these building characteristics explain 
variations in prices surprisingly well (our final R2s exceeded 
0.87), suggesting that the data are rich enough for estimating 
hedonic price equations.
Our results consistently show that the completion of new 
housing units under the Ten-Year Plan was associated with 
increased sales prices of nearby properties. For example, 
Charts 1 and 2 show the regression-adjusted percentage 
difference between prices in the ring and prices in the larger 
census tract, before and after the completion of a project. 
Specifically, Chart 1 shows how prices in the ring changed after 
completion of a Ten-Year-Plan homeownership project of 
three different sizes. The first set of bars shows that before the 
completion of a ten-unit homeownership project, the sales 
price of a property located within 500 feet of a future site was 
on average 6.8 percent lower than the price of a comparable 
property sold in the same quarter in the same census tract. 
After completion, the gap shrunk so that prices in the ring were 
only 3.1 percent lower than prices in the larger census tract.
As can be seen from Chart 1, the impact appears to be 
greater for larger projects. The second set of bars shows that, 
before completion of a project with 100 homeownership units, 
the sales price of a property located within 500 feet of the future 
site was, on average, 6.8 percent lower than the price of a 
comparable property sold in the same quarter in the same 
census tract.12 After completion, prices in the ring actually 
ended up higher than those in the surrounding census tract. 
Similarly, for properties within 500 feet of homeownership 
sites with 200 units, the ring/census tract gap shifted from an 
8.4 percent shortfall in the ring to a 3.9 percent “premium” 
after completion.
For properties within 500 feet of renter-oriented Ten-Year-
Plan projects, we obtained very similar results (Chart 2). The 
one key difference is the very large price gap for properties 
located within 500 feet of a site that will ultimately hold 200 
rental units. We estimated that before completion, prices of 
properties near such large rental project sites were a full 
17 percent lower on average than prices of comparable 
properties located outside the ring, but in the same census 
tract. After completion, the gap decreased by more than 
12 percentage points.
There are several points to highlight here. First, in all cases, 
quality-controlled property values were lower for properties 78 Housing Production Subsidies and Neighborhood Revitalization
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Chart 2
Percentage Price Differences in 500-Foot Ring 
and Surrounding Tracts, by Number of Units Built
Rings with Rental Units Only 
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located within 500 feet of Ten-Year-Plan sites than for 
comparable properties located beyond this distance but in the 
same census tract. Ten-Year-Plan housing, in other words, was 
typically located in the most distressed micro-neighborhoods 
within a census tract. Furthermore, the larger the project, the 
more that distressed property values tended to be in the 
vicinity, and rental projects appear to have been sited in even 
more distressed neighborhoods than homeownership projects. 
These projects, in other words, were not randomly located, 
emphasizing the need to control for these baseline conditions 
when estimating effects.
In addition, the value of properties near Ten-Year-Plan sites 
typically rose significantly relative to prices in their census tract 
after completion of a project, and this increase was sustained 
over time. (The coefficient on the post-completion time trend 
in the ring was statistically insignificant.13) A final, notable 
point is that the greater the number of units, the greater the 
effect. With this said, we found a relatively large, positive 
“fixed” effect common to projects of all sizes. One inter-
pretation of this result is that much of the positive spillover 
effect may derive from the elimination of existing blight; the 
scale or size of the project is less important than the fact that at 
least some units were built.
Consistent with this interpretation, we found that the type 
of project made little difference in determining effects. We 
found no statistically different effects between rental and 
ownership projects, or between units created through the 
rehabilitation of vacant buildings and those built through 
new construction. Structure type was also irrelevant—the 
magnitude of the spillover effect was unchanged whether the 
project was made up of one-to-four-unit buildings or 
multifamily apartment buildings.
In summary, we found that the units created through the 
Ten-Year Plan generated significant and sustained positive 
spillover effects on neighboring properties, indeed, benefits 
that were quite large relative to city subsidies (Ellen, Schill, 
Schwartz, and Voicu 2001). We next review evidence from 
other cities, then speculate as to whether our positive results 
might be unique to New York City and the particular efforts 
made under the Ten-Year Plan.
4.2 Evidence on the Effects of Other
Supply-Side Programs
Although several studies have attempted to quantify the 
spillover effects of place-based subsidized housing, few have 
found statistically significant effects. Some studies have found 
small, positive effects (De Salvo 1974; Rabiega, Lin, and 
Robinson 1984), yet the general conclusion has been that the 
development of subsidized housing has had little or no effect 
on surrounding neighborhoods (Nourse 1963; Schafer 1972; 
see Matulef [1988] and Goetz, Lam, and Heitlinger [1996] for 
a review of the literature). Indeed, attempts to quantify the 
effect of housing quality more generally on the value of 
neighboring properties have largely yielded insignificant 
results. As Mills and Hamilton (1994) write, researchers “have 
almost uniformly failed to find significant and consistent 
effects of neighboring activities on property values.” Although 
economists have not rejected the possibility of spillover effects, 
they speculate that such effects operate mainly in high-density 
neighborhoods, are probably highly localized, and only matter 
when housing is badly deteriorated or abandoned (Mills and 
Hamilton 1994).
During the 1990s, three studies were published suggesting 
that proximity to subsidized housing can affect neighboring 
property values, but the effects were typically negative, at least 
in the case of federally subsidized rental developments (Lyons 
and Loveridge 1993; Goetz, Lam, and Heitlinger 1996; Lee, 
Culhane, and Wachter 1999). Other recent studies have 
suggested no significant effect (Briggs, Darden, and Aidala 
1999; Cummings, DiPasquale, and Kahn 2001).
One recent paper comes to a more hopeful conclusion 
about place-based subsidies. Santiago, Galster, and Tatian 
(2001) used a hedonic model with localized fixed effects to 
study whether the purchase and renovation of property by the 
Denver Housing Authority, and its conversion into subsidized 
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single-family homes. The authors found that proximity to 
dispersed public housing units was, on average, associated with 
a modest increase in the prices of single-family homes. But they 
found that these positive benefits were weakest in the poorest 
areas. Indeed, the effects were consistently negative in 
substantially black neighborhoods. This contrasts sharply with 
our research on New York City, which found substantial 
positive effects in the city’s poorest neighborhoods.
4.3 Why Are New York City’s 
Results Stronger?
We have several hypotheses for why our results suggest larger 
and more positive spillover effects: differences in data and 
methods, more favorable housing market conditions, a more 
favorable mix of housing, a greater level of municipal 
commitment, and a greater focus on neighborhood 
revitalization. Note that another possible difference is timing—
most prior research examined large-scale federal housing 
programs from an earlier era. There may be common 
macroeconomic, sociological, or political explanations for 
different outcomes in those earlier periods. Thus, when 
comparing our results with those for other cities, we pay 
particular attention to six studies that have focused on more 
recent housing programs: Lyons and Loveridge (1993), Goetz, 
Lam, and Heitlinger (1996), Lee, Culhane, and Wachter 
(1999), Briggs, Darden, and Aidala (1999), Cummings, 
DiPasquale, and Kahn (2001), and Santiago, Galster, and 
Tatian (2001). Table 3 provides summary information on these 
studies.
Data and Methods
It is possible that the differences in results are rooted in 
differences in data and methods. Our study is based on an 
extraordinarily rich data set. The large number and variety of 
housing units built, the long time frame, and the large volume 
of sales data allow us to employ a data-intensive methodology 
that incorporates many of the best features of previous studies.
The most important methodological challenge in estimating 
the effect of subsidized housing is identifying the appropriate 
counterfactual. One approach is to compare price levels in 
areas receiving subsidized housing with comparable properties 
that have no subsidized housing. This yields an unbiased 
estimate of the effect if the only difference between the areas is 
the housing investment—which is difficult to determine. If the 
prices of homes tend to be lower near subsidized housing sites, 
is this because the development of subsidized housing 
depressed housing values or because the subsidized housing 
was located in a more distressed area? A second approach 
compares property values before and after housing investment, 
which yields an unbiased estimate of the effect if there is no 
Table 3
Projects and Units in the Analyses of Assisted Housing Effects










Briggs et al. (1999) Dispersed Yonkers, New York 200 7 1985-96 3,101
Santiago et al. (2001) Dispersed Denver 118a 92 1987:1-1997:3 43,361
Cummings et al. (2000) Homeownership Philadelphia 311 2 1986-97 146,053




Goetz et al. (1996) Nonprofit developed Minneapolis 476 23 1994 22,156
Lee et al. (1999) Multiple federally assisted Philadelphia NAc 1989-91 18,062
aThis is an estimate based on average number of households per site reported in the authors’ Table 1, “Selected Characteristics of 1989-1997 Vintage
Dispersed Housing Sites” (p. 75).
bThis is a 25 percent sample of the 128,010 nonsubsidized residential units in Ramsey County.
cThe authors do not report total number of units; however, they do include dummy variables for large and high-rise public housing developments.
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other force shaping the growth in property values at the same 
time as the housing investment. But again, there may be other 
forces affecting the target neighborhood that coincide with 
development of subsidized housing, complicating the effort to 
disentangle the specific effect of subsidized housing. Finally, 
effects can be investigated by constructing and estimating an 
econometric model that fully specifies the determinants of 
property values, including the neighborhood characteristics 
and housing investments. Here, unbiased impact estimates 
can only be obtained if the model includes all relevant 
neighborhood characteristics—a formidable challenge. (See 
Galster, Tatian, and Smith [1999] for a fuller discussion of 
alternative approaches to estimating impacts of subsidized 
housing.)
Using more detailed data and a clever methodology, 
Santiago, Galster, and Tatian (2001) are able to sort out 
causality more persuasively than the other studies, and 
therefore we place more weight on their results. They use a 
hedonic model with localized fixed effects and, in contrast to 
earlier research, they also control for past trends in housing 
prices in the immediate vicinity of a project. That is, they 
control for both past levels and trends in housing prices in the 
baseline neighborhood and therefore control for any tendency 
of the housing authority to develop housing in neighborhoods 
where prices were already rising.
We adapt their methodology in our approach, and our 
results are, in some sense, most comparable to theirs. As noted 
earlier, we estimate effects based upon the assumption that in 
the absence of the Ten-Year-Plan units, properties within 
500 feet of the sites would have appreciated in value at the same 
rate as comparable properties in the same census tract, but 
outside of the 500-foot ring. That seems particularly reasonable 
given the small size of these rings. Put differently, our estimates 
are identified as the difference in the growth in property values 
before and after the housing investment relative to the growth 
in prices in a comparable area—outside the ring but in the 
same census tract. Thus, our methodology combines the best of 
the alternative strategies described above and, as a result, our 
findings are less likely to be biased. (Our estimates will be 
biased only if there was some force affecting property values 
differentially inside and outside the ring at the same time as the 
housing investment.)
Equally important, our analyses are based on a rich data set 
including information on an extraordinarily large number of 
transactions and an enormous number of units. As shown in 
Table 3, earlier studies typically examined the effect of several 
hundred subsidized units, spread across a number of projects. 
By contrast, we examined the effect of approximately 66,000 
new subsidized units, developed at different times over several 
years, in a wide range of neighborhoods. Thus, it is harder to 
believe that some other contemporaneous phenomenon was 
responsible for lifting property values in the proximity of the 
Ten-Year-Plan units while leaving properties outside the ring 
but in the same neighborhood unaffected. One would have to 
believe that this phenomenon occurred at different times in 
different neighborhoods at the same time as the housing 
investment.
Note that the small number of subsidized units examined in 
many of the other earlier studies has made it difficult to form 
sharp estimates. Although estimated effects may have been 
positive, standard errors are large. Briggs, Darden, and Aidala 
(1999) and Cummings, DiPasquale, and Kahn (2001), for 
instance, found that subsidized housing had a positive but 
statistically insignificant effect on surrounding property values. 
It may be that a larger number of projects would have yielded 
smaller standard errors and found positive and statistically 
significant effects. (It is also possible, of course, that expanding 
the number of projects would have revealed negative and 
significant effects.)
Housing Market Conditions
A second possible explanation for the difference in findings is 
that housing market conditions were simply more propitious 
in New York City than elsewhere. During this time, the city was 
gaining population largely fueled by enormous waves of 
immigration, in sharp contrast to Philadelphia (where two of 
these earlier studies were undertaken), which lost 4 percent of 
its residents between 1990 and 2000. Vacancy rates were also 
quite low in New York City during this time—the rental 
vacancy rate in the city fell to 3.2 percent in 1999 (Daniels and 
Schill 2001). Vacancy rates in the Philadelphia metropolitan 
area were, by comparison, more than 8 percent—and 
undoubtedly higher still in the city itself. As noted above, place-
based housing programs are likely to be most effective in tight 
housing markets, where they can help to meet growing 
demand. Thus, the difference in findings may reflect what 
common sense (and economics) suggests. In cities like 
Philadelphia in the 1990s, with a shrinking population and 
high vacancy rates, housing investment is likely to have (at 
best) little effect on values of neighboring properties—an 
infusion of new housing was probably not what the city’s 
distressed neighborhoods needed. Indeed, additional housing 
may have promoted filtering and the removal of buildings from 
the housing stock. In growing New York City, with very little 
vacant housing and a preponderance of structural barriers that 
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Schill, and Stark 1999), public housing investment may have 
been a highly effective spur to neighborhood economic 
development.
Alternatively, New York’s extraordinarily high density may 
also have contributed to the larger effects. Clearly, we would 
expect spillover effects to be larger in neighborhoods with 
higher densities. In 1990, population density was more than 
twice as high in New York City than in Philadelphia and three 
and a half times as high as it was in Minneapolis—the site of 
three of our comparison studies.
Mix of Housing
A third possible explanation for New York’s difference con-
cerns the type of housing built by the city. That is, the mix of 
housing built in New York may have been disproportionately 
composed of the type that would generate larger neighborhood 
spillover effects. Although plausible, this explanation is 
undermined to some extent by the fact that our research found 
no differences in spillover effects across different types of 
housing. In addition, New York’s focus on income mixing may 
have made a difference. Rather than concentrating the very 
poorest households in particular neighborhoods or projects, 
the city generally aimed to create housing with a mix of incomes.
Level of Commitment
New York City’s Ten-Year Plan may have had a greater effect 
than initiatives of other cities because of New York’s level of 
commitment. Mayor Koch, in announcing the Ten-Year Plan, 
placed his prestige and that of his housing agency on the line in 
committing the city to an effort of unprecedented magnitude 
and scope. This commitment, together with the quality of the 
staff assembled at the housing agency, may have generated 
confidence on the part of neighborhood residents, financial 
institutions, and investors, encouraging them to contribute 
their own resources and time to revitalization activities.
Focus on Neighborhood Revitalization
Finally, the explanation may lie in New York City’s explicit 
emphasis on neighborhood revitalization. As noted above, one 
of the key objectives of the Ten-Year Plan (if not the key 
objective) was to reclaim parts of the city that had been 
destroyed by arson and disinvestment during the 1970s. In the 
programs evaluated in other cities, this aim was far less central. 
In the scattered-site public housing initiatives, for instance, the 
goal was to offer housing opportunities to poor families in 
lower poverty communities (Briggs, Darden, and Aidala 1999; 
Santiago, Galster, and Tatian 2001). Therefore, it is perhaps not 
surprising that New York appears to have been more successful 
in developing housing that benefited the surrounding 
communities.14
Furthermore, New York City chose sites (either buildings or 
vacant land) that were extremely blighted, so that even modest 
improvements may have been able to generate dramatic 
improvements in the blocks surrounding them. Many of the 
cities examined by other researchers were unlikely to have 
faced such pockets of abandonment. If they did, the studies 
may not have so explicitly targeted them. Indeed, in Denver 
and in Yonkers, New York, the aim was to select sites in 
middle-class neighborhoods. These were hardly areas 
characterized by the same devastation as the neighborhoods 
studied in New York City.
4.4 Evidence on the Effects of 
Demand-Oriented Subsidies
Ideally, we would like to obtain estimates of the spillover effects 
of tenant-based vouchers to compare with the housing built 
under the Ten-Year Plan. Unfortunately, such estimates are 
unavailable. Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed above (for 
example, tenants are likely to be dispersed and the aim of 
voucher programs is typically not to revitalize neighborhoods), 
it is unlikely that vouchers would deliver spillover effects of the 
magnitude we found generated by the Ten-Year Plan.
This expectation is modestly supported by other research. 
Galster, Tatian, and Santiago (1999), for example, examine the 
effects of Section 8 tenants on neighboring properties in the 
suburbs surrounding Baltimore. They find, in general, that 
proximity to a small number of Section 8 tenants is linked to 
positive changes in property values. But closer inspection 
showed that these small positive effects were limited to 
properties within 500 feet of no more than six voucher holders. 
For properties close to larger numbers, the net effect proved to 
be negative, and these negative effects were quite substantial for 
the largest concentrations of tenants (more than fifty tenants). 
Moreover, when looking across different types of neighbor-
hoods, the authors find that the positive effects were in fact 
limited to high-value, largely white neighborhoods, as was the 
case in their analysis of scattered-site public housing in Denver.
In short, the authors conclude that Section 8 demand-side 
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but only in higher valued, appreciating, largely white 
communities. The irony, of course, is that these are hardly the 
sorts of neighborhoods where we are likely to be very 
concerned about improving neighborhood quality.
Two other studies examine the effect of voucher households 
on property values: Lyons and Loveridge (1993) find no effect 
on surrounding property values and Lee, Culhane, and 
Wachter (1999) uncover slight negative effects on surrounding 
property values. In short, prior research provides little support 
for the notion that vouchers are likely to lead to the same large, 
positive spillover effects on surrounding properties that we 
estimate were generated by the Ten-Year Plan.
5.C o n c l u s i o n
Since the mid-1970s, the central debate among housing policy 
analysts and government officials has revolved around the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of housing vouchers 
versus supply-oriented subsidies. Study after study 
demonstrated the comparative advantage of vouchers on a 
variety of grounds—ranging from their lower cost to the better 
neighborhoods they enable their recipients to live in. Economic 
theory has suggested that production programs might do better 
than housing vouchers in generating positive spillovers and 
neighborhood revitalization, but empirical studies have never 
quite supported this theory.
New York City’s Ten-Year Capital Plan for Housing pro-
vides advocates of production programs with more optimistic 
results. Our findings suggest that New York’s unprecedented 
expenditure of $5.1 billion on housing production programs 
has generated substantial positive spillovers and contributed to 
neighborhood revitalization. The rebuilding of extraordinarily 
depressed neighborhoods in the South Bronx, Central Harlem, 
and Central Brooklyn seems to have been achieved not just as a 
result of a booming economy and a growing population, but 
also because of an innovative and massive investment of public 
dollars.
Although our research on the utility of production 
programs as a neighborhood revitalization tool in New York 
provides some evidence of the contributions that production 
programs can make in distressed neighborhoods, more 
research is needed. First, our study did not directly compare the 
spillovers generated by production programs with those that 
might accompany housing vouchers. Second, whether the 
success in New York City can be replicated elsewhere remains 
very much an open question. Third, production programs such 
as those utilized by New York City are extremely costly. Our 
research suggests that the benefits achieved in terms of 
increased property values may outweigh the costs of the 
subsidies, yet much more work remains to be done before that 
conclusion can be stated with any level of assurance.Endnotes
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1. For an overview of the theoretical and empirical evidence on the 
relative cost-effectiveness of housing vouchers and certificates, see 
Schill (1993). One recent article has made a counterargument 
(McClure 1998); Shroder and Reiger (2000) have challenged 
McClure’s methodology.
2. According to the report, these estimates of the cost differential 
between voucher and production programs were conservative. They 
did not include the value of tax abatements granted by localities for 
new construction, nor did they include funding of capital reserves. 
The authors estimated that including these costs would have increased 
the differences between the two types of subsidy programs by about 
10 percent.
3. For a summary of the literature on the neighborhood effects of 
concentrated poverty, see Ellen and Turner (1997).
4. A recent paper by Bahchieva and Hosier (2001) indicates that 
between October 1999 and June 2000, 2,263 vouchers issued by the 
New York City Housing Authority for nonemergency reasons were 
picked up by applicants. Only 1,339 applicants successfully rented a 
unit with their vouchers; 1,124 failed to obtain a unit before expiration 
of their vouchers.
5. Recent evidence suggests that black and Latino homeseekers 
encounter unfavorable treatment approximately half of the time they 
transact in the housing market (Ondrich et al. 1999).
6. In this paper, units built or rehabilitated under the Ten-Year Plan 
are defined to include only projects completed between January 1987 
and June 2000. The January 1987 beginning date was selected because 
of the long lag time associated with housing construction. It is likely 
that buildings completed in 1986 were planned and financed long 
before the announcement of the plan. In addition, when we count 
units produced through the plan, we do not include housing units 
built under federal programs such as public housing, Section 8, and 
Section 202 housing. In certain respects, our definition of the Ten-
Year Plan is therefore both under- and overinclusive. Federal housing 
programs that made use of city resources such as city-owned land 
would not be included in our totals. In addition, it is possible that 
completions after 1986 would be included even though planning may 
have begun and funding commitments for the developments may 
have been made before the announcement of the plan in 1985.
7. For more details on financing, see Schill, Ellen, Schwartz, and Voicu 
(2001).
8. Note that Galster, Tatian, and Smith (1999) include census-tract 
fixed effects instead, which assumes neighborhood fixed effects are 
constant over time—an assumption that seems unrealistic over a time 
period as long as ours.
9. Ellen, Schill, Susin, and Schwartz (2001) used ZIP code fixed effects.
10. In Ellen, Schill, Susin, and Schwartz (2001), we also estimate a 
number of alternative specifications (for instance, providing year-by-
year estimates of post-completion effects), but all rely on the same 
fundamental difference-in-difference approach.
11. Because sales of cooperative apartments are not considered sales of 
real property, they are not recorded and were thus not included in our 
analyses. We should also note that most of the apartment buildings in 
our sample are rent-stabilized. Given that legally allowable rents are 
typically above market rents outside of affluent neighborhoods in 
Manhattan and Brooklyn, we do not think that their inclusion biased 
our results (see Pollakowski [1997]).
12. Our specification allowed the precompletion price gap to differ 
only for projects above and below 100 units.
13. In our first paper, we found that the impact of Partnership and 
Nehemiah homes declined over time within the 500-foot ring. Effects 
on properties somewhat more distant from the subsidized homes were 
persistent, however, suggesting that impacts may have diffused 
outward over time.
14. Interestingly, Goetz, Lam, and Heitlinger (1996) found that 
housing developed by community-based nonprofits had positive 
spillover effects, while that developed by the housing authority had 
negative effects. This may be because the community-based 
nonprofits they examined in Minneapolis were more sensitive to 
community effects.References
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